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Abstract 
The proposed studies attempt to synthesize the two areas of research: moral judgment and racial 
bias in hopes to establish a link between a perpetrator’s race and the amount of blame an 
individual gives them. In cognitive research, the process of the blame requires a step-by-step 
process of noticing an event, identifying whether an agent is involved, deciding whether the 
event was intentional, and then reviewing the agent’s justifications, obligations to prevent the 
occurrence, and their ability to prevent the occurrence. Racial bias research has clear evidence of 
prejudice between own-race and other-race attitudes. This can be shown through the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT) and the Attitudes Towards Blacks (ATB) scale. The hypothesis in this 
research is that participants will blame other-race perpetrators more, and own-race perpetrators 
less than a no-race-given control for the same moral trespass. There are two competing theories 
on how this works. The first is that racial attitudes directly bias blame judgments without 
affecting the underlying information processing leading to blame. The second theory 
hypothesizes that racial attitudes intensify blame judgments by changing the way people evaluate 
the informational components on which blame depends (i.e., causality, intentionality, reasons, 
preventability). . The present research tests these two competing theories using  a combination of 
previously validated measures, such as the IAT and ATB, as well as recently developed vignettes 
that will measure participants’ amount of blame for race-specific perpetrators. Overall, the 
research hopes to conclude that race has a significant relationship with the process of blame. 
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Racial Bias and Its Relationship with Moral Blame 
Recent, heavily publicized, police shootings of unarmed Black men have sparked 
increased concern over racial bias in police decisions to use lethal force. One proposal to address 
these shootings is to require police to wear body camera so that there would be first-hand 
evidence of the event. However, people’s reactions to recent cases where shootings were 
videotaped show that people often disagree on the acceptability of what occurred. In essence, 
two people can view the same footage, and come to completely separate conclusions. This 
difference in perceptions also causes problems when choosing where to place blame.  
While numerous studies have detailed the inputs to blame (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 
2012; 2014), relatively little work to date has examined the process people go through from 
observing a moral violation to rendering and expressing a moral judgment of blame. The current 
work seeks to examine the process of blaming, and more specifically how personal racial biases 
might influence that process. Past research demonstrates broad consensus that racial beliefs bias 
moral and legal judgments; however, it remains unclear exactly how these beliefs operate in the 
process of blame.  
The current work proposes two experiments to test how racial bias might influence moral 
judgments of blame. Below I review the existing research on the criteria and the process of 
blame; I review the evidence for racial bias influencing judgments in non-moral domains; and I 
outline my predictions and proposed experiments. 
The Path Model of Blame  
Malle et al. (2014) recently proposed the Path Model of Blame. This model is unique in 
that it not only defines the necessary informational components for blame, but it also specifies 
the information processing structure people move through from perceiving a moral violation 
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(e.g., a dead body on the ground) to rendering a moral judgment of blame. That is, the Path 
Model goes beyond previous moral judgments models that enumerate the relevant inputs to 
blame, by specifying how those inputs go together in a cognitive process of blaming. 
According to the model, the process of blame begins with detecting a moral norm 
violation. This requires a system of broadly agreed upon norms of behavior against which 
perceivers can compare violations. Moral norms vary widely. Some researchers argue that moral 
judgments arise in response to violations of distinct moral domains, including care, sanctity, 
fairness, authority, and ingroup loyalty (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Other researchers 
suggest that moral norms relate to the motivation to regulate different types of social 
relationships such maintaining cooperation or social hierarchies (Rai & Fiske, 2011); whereas 
others distinguish between behaviors that should be performed (i.e., prescriptive norms) and 
behaviors that should not be performed (i.e., proscriptive norms; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 
2013). Regardless of the specific norms that perceivers are sensitive to, detecting moral norm 
violations can be done without Theory of Mind (ToM) or emotionality, as individuals with 
autism can reliably detect norm-violating events (Zalla, Sav, Stopin, Ahade, & Leboyer, 2009); 
also psychopaths can do it (Maxwell & Le Sage, 2009). 
After detecting a moral violation, perceivers evaluate whether the cause of the event was 
a morally responsible agent. The concept of agency emerges early in development based on 
features such as self-propelledness (Premack, 1990) and goal-directed action (Woodward, 1998). 
Bandura (2006) argued that agency requires four key mental capacities: intentionality, 
forethought, self-reactiveness, and self-reflectiveness (Bandura, 2006). Thus, agency requires 
that an agent can control one’s behavior and act in light of relevant norms (see Monroe, Dillion, 
& Malle, 2014). If the cause of the event is not a morally responsible agent (e.g., if lightning 
RACIAL BIAS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH MORAL BLAME 7 
struck the victim dead or if an infant accidentally shot the victim), then little or no blame is 
assigned. If, however, the cause of the event was a morally responsible agent then perceivers 
consider whether the agent caused the outcome intentionally.  
Judgments of intentionality are unique in the process of blame. Intentionality is a critical 
input to blame. People quickly perceive intentionality in everyday situations (Malle & Holbrook, 
2012), often perceptually (Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000) or as part of scripts (Schank & Abelson, 
1977), but they may also more carefully consider if an agent acted intentionally if actions are 
ambiguous (Guglielmo & Malle, 2010a, 2010b; Monroe & Reeder, 2011) or if the weight of the 
judgment demands it (Reeder, 2009). Moreover, previous research demonstrates that 
intentionality amplifies blame (Darley & Shultz, 1990; Gray & Wegner, 2008; Lagnado & 
Channon, 2008; Ohtsubo, 2007; Young & Saxe, 2009).   
Intentionality also structures the process of blaming by bifurcating information 
processing onto one of two independent tracks (Monroe & Malle, 2017). If a behavior is judged 
to be intentional, then perceivers evaluate the agent’s reasons for acting. Providing morally good 
reasons for harm (e.g., wanting to protect one’s family from attack) will mitigate blame, while 
morally bad reasons (e.g., attacking someone in cold blood) will exacerbate it (Howe, 1991; 
Reeder, Kumar, Hesson-McInnis, & Trafimow, 2002; Tetlock, Self, Singh, 2010).  Recently, 
Greene et al. (2009) found that inferences about motives shape people’s moral judgments in 
sacrificial moral dilemmas, such as the trolley problem, where participants are asked to a 
decision to either allow five people to die, or to save them by killing one other person. When the 
decision to kill one to save five is described as malicious, participants are much less likely to 
accept his actions as morally permissible; however, when sacrificing one workman is described 
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as a side effect of a goal to save the lives of the others, acceptance increases (Greene et al., 
2009). 
By contrast, if the behavior is deemed unintentional, perceivers evaluate whether the 
agent had the obligation to prevent the outcome, and whether the agent had the ability to prevent 
the outcome. In this instance, the observer is determining alternate possibilities (what could or 
should have happened; Mandel & Lehman, 1996). The ability to prevent an outcome is based on 
the agent’s cognitive capability to foresee harm and her physical capability to prevent such harm. 
As such, when an agent foresaw a negative event and did nothing to stop it, they were assigned 
significantly more blame (as opposed to when the agent did not foresee the negative event). This 
factor is referred to as foreseeability, and has been shown in both children and adults (Nelson-le 
Gall, 1985; Shaw & Sulzer, 1964). Foreseeability would be considered a measure of a person’s 
mental capacity, and as such, people with mental disability are assigned less foreseeability and 
thus less blame when negative events occur. However, physical capacity is also a measure an 
agent’s ability to prevent a negative event. For example, obesity not due to a medical condition 
intensifies blame rather than mitigating because the agent could have controlled his or her 
obesity (Weiner, 1995). Unfortunately, this also extends to victim blaming in rape cases, where 
perceivers begin to think of alternate behaviors that victim could have taken (Catellani, Alberici, 
& Milesi, 2004). This type of behavior during the blame process can then lead to self-blame, as 
many sexual assault victims end up blaming themselves (Davis et al., 1996; Janoff-Bulman, 
1979; Janoff-Bulman & Wortman, 1977). This happens because victims focus on their actual 
capacity to take alternate actions, but do not take into account their obligation to take such 
actions. 
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Comparatively, not as much research has examined agent’s obligations to prevent 
negative events. One of the main factors, though, that affects obligation to prevent is the agent’s 
role. For example, doctors have the obligation to keep their patients healthy, so if a patient dies 
due to a doctor’s negligence, blame is assigned because the doctor did not fulfill his or her duty. 
All this being said, if the person either had no obligation to or was unable to prevent the negative 
circumstance, blame is not generally assigned. However, if they were expected to prevent, and 
they were also fully able to do so but did not, then blame in varying degrees is assigned. 
Information Processing, Preset Values, and Bias 
In addition to making predictions about the structure of information processing en route 
to blame, the Path Model makes a second set of predictions about how people set the values of 
each individual concept in the model (e.g., intentionality, reasons, or preventability). The model 
predicts that once a concept is activated, perceivers gather information relating to that concept, 
and then use that information to determine its value (e.g., resolving that “Fred intentionally hit 
Jim.”). Information acquisition includes the retrieval of knowledge (remembering the agent’s 
role), informational searching (questioning an agent’s intentionality or justifications), and 
simulation (what could the agent have done better?) among other things. This part of the process 
can either be automatic or deliberate, when information about a concept is not immediately 
obvious. Cases where this is automatic rely on event-implied information (e.g., a man standing 
over a dead body holding a smoking gun), which is information gained from observing the event 
or its results.   
Importantly, one way people can fill in information required for a concept is with preset 
values. These are shortcuts that are activated by knowledge structures such as a target’s race, 
occupation, age, religion, and many other constructs. For instance, preset values may be 
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associated with certain roles (as mentioned earlier with doctors), group membership (e.g., rivals 
always intentionally harm us) or erroneous beliefs. For example, people who subscribe to rape 
myths may have systematically different preset values for the preventability of sexual assault 
(i.e., believing that the victim could have prevented the assault had she been dressed differently 
or not been drinking) compared to people who reject such myths (Grubb & Turner, 2012; 
McCaul, Veltum, Boyechko, & Crawford, 1990).  
These presets values are critically important, as they may be one way systematic bias 
may enter into the process of blame.  If people have different implicit or explicit preset values 
when making moral judgments of White versus Black norm violators, then one would expect that 
based on these different presets people could observe the same behavior and yet draw different 
moral conclusions about the agent. While no study to date has examined such a question, 
evidence that racial bias influences other types of morally-relevant decisions is well documented. 
Racial Bias in Decision-Making   
 There is a large field dedicated to investigating racial bias, and how it affects the ways 
people view racial out-group members, though as of yet there has been no research solely 
dedicated to how these attitudes enter the blame process. Racial prejudice is defined as negative 
attitudes, beliefs, or emotions motivated by a target’s race (Blumer, 1958; Herek, 2004) 
However, whereas prejudice refers to a particular set of biased attitudes a person may hold, 
discrimination refers to specific behaviors motivated by prejudicial attitudes. Acts of 
discrimination may include excluding out-group members from certain activities, preferring to 
socialize solely with in-group members, giving privileges to in-group members, and violence 
against out-group members.  
Implicit and Explicit Bias 
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Importantly, researchers differentiate between explicitly held prejudicial attitudes and 
implicit prejudice. While both correspond to an individual’s biased attitudes, implicit bias refers 
to a suite of attitudes that are typically unconscious and automatic (see Gawronski, Hofmann, & 
Wilbur, 2006; Kahn & Martin, 2016); whereas explicit prejudice refers to a person’s consciously 
accessible, controlled, and (perhaps even) endorsed biases (Rydell & McConnell, 2006; 
Thurstone, 1928; Thurstone & Chave, 1929).  
Because implicit and explicit prejudice operate at different speeds and levels of conscious 
awareness, researchers use different tools to measure them.  For example, common measures of 
explicit prejudice include the Attitudes Toward Blacks scale (ATB) or the Modern Racism scale 
developed by (McConahay,1986). These measures ask people to self-report their attitudes 
towards a target group, which can be any chosen group, such as Blacks or homosexuals. For 
example, one question on the ATB scale is: “I worry that in the next few years I may be denied 
my application for a job or a promotion because of preferential treatment given to minority group 
members.” Most measures of explicit bias are designed to measure beliefs that individuals 
openly state they hold, and are more frequently used than measures of implicit bias (Greenwald 
& Banaji, 1995). 
Whereas explicit prejudice is consciously accessible, measures of explicit prejudice rely 
on people’s self-reported attitudes. Implicit prejudice, by contrast, is thought to be automatic and 
not available to introspection; therefore, measures of implicit prejudice rely on more subtle 
measures, such as the speed with which people are able to make positive versus negative 
associations with different racial targets. One of the most prominent measures of this kind is the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT) developed by Greenwald and Banaji (1995). The IAT measures 
implicit prejudice by presenting participants with a series of association tasks with stimuli of 
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cropped photos of Black or White target faces. Participants are also given positive or negative 
stimuli words such as “good” and “beautiful” or “bad” and “terrible.” In the first task, 
participants are asked to pair the White faces with positive words, and the Black faces with 
negative words. In the second task, this is reversed. Participants must pair Black faces with 
positive terms, and White faces with negative terms. The IAT then measures the response times 
for each task, as well as the number of mistakes each participant made, and then calculates a 
level for the participant’s implicit biases. 
Not only are explicit and implicit prejudice measured with different tools, but they also 
are differentially predictive of behavior. On one hand, explicit biases are conscious and 
sometimes endorsed, while implicit biases are unconscious and cannot be controlled by those 
who hold them (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, 
and Howard (1997) showed that explicit prejudice correlated with deliberate types of 
discriminatory behavior whereas implicit attitudes correlated with only unintentional behaviors 
(bodily movements, eye twitching) indicative of discomfort when in the presence of an other-
race individual. This suggests that explicit attitudes map more closely onto conscious, intentional 
behaviors, whereas implicit attitudes better predict automatic or unintentional behaviors.  
Therefore, research suggests that implicit bias can be found even when explicit bias is 
not. However, whether a person acts on their implicit biases or not, actions can be perceived as 
intentionally biased by some, and unintentionally biased by others. It has also been shown that 
these implicit biases can be detected through psychological testing, such as the IAT, and what 
this testing has revealed is that not all biases are directly discriminatory. This is because 
discrimination implies intentionality, and implicit biases are not intentional. Certain biases, in 
fact, favor members of the in-group based on shared physical traits based on how easily and 
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accurately a person is recognized, rather than persecuting out-groups members for traits not 
shared.  
Racial Bias in the World 
Much research examines how racial bias operates in the real world. One area where racial 
bias presents itself is employment. This effect is shown mostly in terms of ethnicity and race 
with significant disadvantages for Hispanic and African Americans (Braddock & McPartland, 
1987; Culp & Dunson, 1986). There are multiple steps in the employment process, one of the 
first being a job interview. Job interview refers to inviting an applicant to a meeting, in order to 
gain first person experience of their character and qualifications. Here, both explicit and implicit 
biases can play major roles, as either direct hatred, or “classic racism” as Kirscheman and 
Neckerman (1991) refer to it, or cultural misunderstandings. This happens because inter-race 
interactions are still affected by factors like suspicion (Blauner, 1989). This could also have to do 
with Own-Race-Bias, as interviewers of any race will prefer same-race applicants. Kochman 
(1983) also points out that White and Black people also misidentify one another’s behavioral 
cues, leading to misunderstandings. These factors taken together, as well as the overwhelming 
white majority of the population and work force, can stack the odds against minority applicants. 
Finally, employment tests are exams that measure aptitude for specific job skills. Meta-analyses 
for research looking into the correlation between test scores and job performance found that the 
tests favored non-minorities (Burstein & Pitchford, 1990; Hartigan & Wigdor, 1989). These 
findings suggest (strongly) that minorities are significantly disadvantaged in employment, due to 
the biases against them, which more often than not, are actually biases favoring the majority’s in-
group, and are not intentionally discriminatory, but sometimes produce that effect.  
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Another area that racial bias works against minorities is police shootings. Minorities 
often self-report police abuse (Weitzer & Tuch, 2004), and bias in law enforcement is difficult to 
measure. Correll, Park, Judd, and Wintenbrink (2002) developed a videogame in his article the 
Police Officer’s Dilemma as a measure of people’s implicit against Black men in shooting 
decisions.  In this task subjects make quick decisions – in the order of seconds – of whether to 
shoot or not to shoot a person holding an ambiguous object in his hand. The test varies the race 
of the target person (White vs. Black) and the object the person is holding (a gun vs. a tool). The 
task measures two key variables: the speed with which people make shoot/don’t shoot decisions 
and the number of errors people make (e.g., shooting an unarmed person or failing to shoot an 
armed person). Results show that people are more likely to mistakenly shoot unarmed Black 
men. Interestingly, however, Correll et al. (2002) found that this error pattern holds for both 
White and Black participants.  
 Correll et al. (2007) developed another experiment to test the effects of implicit bias on 
shootings made by non-police officers. When not given enough time to consciously process a 
situation, people will most likely mistakenly shoot the unarmed Black man. They showed that 
although laypeople again showed the shooter bias effect against black targets as opposed to white 
targets, police officers did not show such a bias. However, both police and laypeople showed a 
reaction time bias. Both sets of participants made faster shoot decisions when the target was an 
armed Black man compared to an armed White man. By contrast when the target person was 
unarmed it took both sets of participants longer to decide not to shoot the unarmed Black man 
compared to deciding not to shoot the unarmed White man. Thus, while police did not show the 
shooter bias that laypeople did, the pattern of response times demonstrate that even trained police 
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find it easier to associate Black targets with danger compared to White targets. However, as time 
was manipulated in order for faster decisions to be made, error rates in shooting decisions rose.   
Finally, racial bias is also heavily present in the courtroom. Statistically, White jurors will 
treat Black defendants worse than White defendants (Kang, Bennett, Carbado, & Casey 2012). 
Finally, research by Levinson, Cai, and Young (2009) looked into mock jury cases. The 
researchers found that when the defendant was Black, they were much more likely to be deemed 
guilty. Furthermore, when asked to recall, most of the mock jurors could not consciously state 
the defendant’s race, implying that it was their implicit biases that affected the overall guilty/not 
guilty decision. Finally, the researchers looked into the legal ramifications of the IAT, but 
instead of using legally ambiguous terms like “good” or “bad,” they proposed using “guilty” and 
“not guilty.” The results of their “Legal IAT” found that participants did show implicit biases 
with stronger associations being drawn between Blacks (as opposed to Whites) and “Guilty,” as 
well as Whites and “Not Guilty.”   
Racial bias is a far-reaching issue that affects society in many ways. In some cases, bias 
is explicit, making it easy to detect and deal with. However, bias can also be implicit, or 
unconscious, making it very difficult for even the person with the biases to notice, let alone 
correct. Implicit bias reaches in many aspects of the world, from employment to law 
enforcement, and as of yet, there has not been a method produced that can significantly reduce 
implicit biases.  
Synthesis 
 The Path Model (Malle et al., 2014) proposed a model of blame that outlines the 
necessary criteria for rendering moral judgments of blame as well as specifying the information 
processing requirements for blame.  Critical in this model is the prediction that the values of 
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informational nodes of the model (e.g., intentionality) can be preset by people’s individual 
beliefs and attitudes.  If correct, these informational presets would allow us model how bias 
might get into the process of blame.  
My project examines one possible relationship between a specific type of bias, racial 
prejudice, and moral blame.  Whereas previous research has established ways of measuring 
explicit and implicit and demonstrated their relationships with morally relevant outcomes such as 
discriminatory behavior (Blumer, 1958; Herek, 2004), hypothetical shooting decisions (Correll et 
al. 2002), hiring decisions (Braddock & McPartland, 1987; Culp & Dunson, 1986), and jury 
decision making (Levinson et al., 2009), no work to date has specifically examined the 
relationships of these biases with moral decision-making more broadly. In doing so, I outline and 
test two alternative hypotheses for how racial attitudes might affect moral judgments of blame. 
One hypothesis for how racial attitudes might affect blame judgments is that racial 
attitudes intensify blame judgments directly, leaving information processing (e.g., considering an 
agents reasons or intentions) unaffected. From this hypothesis, people who strongly endorse 
racially-biased attitudes would make harsher moral judgments of blame compared to people who 
do not endorse racially-biased attitudes; however, both people with high and low racial biases 
would appraise a target’s intentions, reasons, and causal contributions identically.  
An alternative hypothesis, derived from the Path Model of Blame (Malle et al., 2014) is 
that racial attitudes intensify blame judgments by changing the way people evaluate the 
informational components on which blame depends (i.e., causality, intentionality, reasons, 
preventability).  From this view, people who strongly endorse racially-biased attitudes will be 
more likely to inflate a target’s causal contributions to a negative outcome; to perceive targets as 
causing harm intentionally (rather than unintentionally); to perceive agents as acting for 
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unjustified or morally bad reasons (compared to morally good reasons); or to perceive agents as 
being able to prevent harm (rather than not) compared to people who do not endorse racially-
biased attitudes. Thus, from this view, people who strongly endorse racially-biased attitudes 
arrive at harsher overall blame judgments, because of bias in their perceptions of the morally 
relevant evidence (causality, intentions, reasons, preventability).  
In order to evaluate each of these hypotheses, experimental designs are being aimed at 
each theory. To test whether the outcome is being affected (rather than information processing), 
a moral updating paradigm is being proposed to test explicit biases in the context of the blame 
model. The participants will be given time to think about the blame judgments they are making, 
which creates the proper circumstances for explicit biases to show. Participants will also take the 
IAT and ATB in order to have a standardized measure of bias. Contrariwise, to test whether 
information processing is being affected, a reaction time paradigm is proposed, since the quick 
answer model will not allow for explicit biases to show, leaving only implicit biases to affect the 
participants’ responses. These two studies together should both produce results that more clearly 
define which of the two hypotheses about the nature of the relationship between racial bias and 
moral blame is better supported. 
Proposed Methods 
To test these opposing hypotheses, I am proposing two experiments. Study 1 will use a 
reaction time paradigm to test whether people with higher racial (compared to people with low 
racial bias) bias more can more easily detect negative mental states for African American targets 
compared to Caucasian targets. In this study, I will assess participants’ explicit and implicit 
racial attitudes using the ATB (Brigham, 1993) and the IAT (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) 
respectively. Afterwards, participants will complete a reaction time paradigm where they will be 
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presented with brief stimuli sentences (e.g., “[agent] a successful filmmaker, only gives his ailing 
mother $20 a month.”) and then asked to make a speeded mental state inference about the 
agent’s bad/good reasons, bad/good intentions, or capacity/obligation to prevent the action (e.g., 
“Did the behavior reveal a certain INTENTION the actor has?”). I will manipulate the name of 
the agent, within-subjects, such that in half of the trials the agent’s name will be a stereotypically 
African American name (e.g., Darius) or a stereotypically White name (e.g., Chuck) in the other 
half of trials. Thus, this study will test whether people with higher explicit or implicit bias 
(relative to people with low bias) more quickly and more frequently detect negative mental states 
for African American targets compared to White targets. 
Study 2 will use a moral updating paradigm to test how racial attitudes affect the way 
people use causal mental state information (good vs. bad reasons, intentional vs. unintentional, 
preventable vs. unpreventable) to update previously made moral judgments. As in Study 1, I will 
assess explicit and implicit racial attitudes using the ATB (Brigham, 1993) and the IAT 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) as part of a broader demographic questionnaire. After these 
measures, participants will complete the moral updating paradigm. In this paradigm, participants 
will be presented with a sparse description of a moral event (e.g., [agent] killed Frank) and asked 
to make an initial moral judgment (e.g., how much blame does [agent] deserve). Then 
participants will be presented with some additional information describing the agent’s reasons, 
intentions or ability to prevent the event, and then allowed to update their blame judgment if they 
want to. As in Study 1 I will manipulate the name of the agents, within-subjects, such that in half 
of the trials the agent’s name will be a stereotypically African American name (e.g., Darius) and 
a stereotypically White name (e.g., Chuck) in the other half of trials. In this way I can examine 
whether people with high racial bias (relative to low) asymmetrically attend to and use blame-
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exacerbating information (e.g., bad reasons, intentional, preventable) over blame-mitigating 
information (e.g., good reasons, unintentional, unpreventable) in updating moral judgments of 
blame for African American targets.  
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